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STRATEGIC PLANNING
BY THE CHAIRMEN,
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
1990 TO 2005


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FOREWORD

Throughout literature, we have learned from the ways that others have used systems and processes to respond to challenges. This Letort Paper by Dr. Richard Meinhardt builds upon his doctoral dissertation, *Strategic Planning Through An Organizational Lens*, that examined what higher education leaders could learn from the Chairmen Joint Chiefs of Staff's strategic planning in the 1990s and updates that examination through 2005 to reflect Chairman Myers' use. This update is particularly relevant because the challenges that our leaders faced in the first half of the 2000s with the Global War on Terror were different than those of the 1990s. In response to these new challenges, this strategic planning system continued to evolve as it retained stability in plans and resource products and accommodated changes in vision, strategies and assessments.

How leaders use strategic planning to position their organizations to respond to the complexities of their environment has multiple perspectives whether a person has a background in business, education, government, or the military. While this paper has historical relevancy, its main value is from a leader's perspective. As such, it identifies key concepts relevant for today's leaders to consider when using strategic planning that focuses on vision, strategic planning process and product characteristics, magnitude of change, and organizational culture.


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RICHARD MEINHART is currently serving as a Professor of Defense and Joint Processes at the Army War College in the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management. He is a retired Air Force Colonel who has served in a variety of logistics-related assignments on the Air Force Staff, Army General Staff, and Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as at three overseas locations. Dr. Meinhart's research and writing interests are in the areas of leadership, strategic planning, and thinking competencies. Dr. Meinhart received a doctorate in education from The George Washington University and has masters' degrees from the Naval War College and Central Michigan University.

SUMMARY

Military leaders at many levels have used strategic planning in various ways to position their organizations to respond to the demands of the current situation, while simultaneously focusing on future challenges. This Letort Paper examines how four Chairmen Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1990 to 2005 used a strategic planning system to enable them to meet their statutory responsibilities specified in Title 10 US Code and respond to the ever-changing strategic environment. These responsibilities include: assisting the President and Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction to the armed forces; conducting strategic planning and net assessments to determine military capabilities; preparing contingency planning and assessing preparedness; and providing advice on requirements, programs, and budgets.

The Chairman's strategic planning system is a primary and formal way he executes these responsibilities as this system creates products to integrate defense processes and influence others related to assessment, vision, strategy, resources, and plans. This planning system integrates the processes and documents of the people and organizations above the Chairman, which are the President and Secretary of Defense, and the people and organizations he directly coordinates with, which primarily are the different military services and combatant commanders. In addition to influencing the nation's senior leaders, this system provides specific direction for many staffs that support these leaders. As such, this planning system is a key process that integrates the Nation's military strategy, plans, and resources that consist of approximately 2.24 million active, guard, and reserve forces and total defense outlays of \$465B by 2005.

In examining how Generals Colin L. Powell (1989-93), John M. Shalikashvili (1993-97), Henry Hugh Shelton (1997-2001) and Richard B. Myers (2001-05) used a strategic planning system, this paper briefly describes the Chairman's key responsibilities and strategic challenges. There were different strategic challenges in the decade of the 1990s versus the first half of the 2000s, and these challenges are compared and contrasted. The Joint Staff's key organizational characteristics and the Chairmen's leadership styles are examined briefly, because they will affect how a strategic planning system is used. The paper

then describes how the strategic planning system itself evolved as processes and products formally changed five different times. These incremental changes resulted in the strategic planning system evolving from a rigid, Cold War focus at the beginning of the 1990s to a more flexible, vision oriented, and resource focused system when this decade ended. In the 2000s, this system became more focused on the War on Terror and on defining joint capabilities.

This planning system produced many products at various frequencies that were both classified and unclassified. These products are described for their broad impact and influence in the five main categories of assessment, vision, strategy, resources, and plans. The paper then summarizes the more significant ways each Chairman used this strategic planning system to provide formal advice and direction, which is an important part of his leadership legacy. For example, General Powell greatly simplified the planning system he inherited and published the first unclassified national military strategy that endures today. General Shalikashvili kept the flexibility and simplicity he inherited, but added long-term direction by publishing the Chairman's first vision and expanded resource advice by adding an analytical assessment process and another resource product. General Shelton used the planning system in a very process-oriented manner and focused on executing his predecessor's vision before updating it. General Myers expanded the system's focus by publishing an additional strategy that was focused on terrorism and changed internal processes to cultivate greater joint capabilities and interdependence.

While this comprehensive assessment of each Chairman's use of strategic planning has historical relevancy, its main value is that today's leaders can learn from how these four leaders used systems and processes differently to respond to their complex global environment and varied strategic challenges. Specific leadership concepts illustrated throughout the paper include how leaders used vision; how leaders balanced flexibility and structure in strategic planning processes and products; how leaders used strategic planning to respond to different types of global challenges; and how leaders used systems to influence an organization's climate and culture. The paper concludes by identifying five key leadership concepts that future leaders need to consider when they use strategic planning.

STRATEGIC PLANNING BY THE CHAIRMEN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, 1990 TO 2005

INTRODUCTION

Military leaders at many levels have used strategic planning in various ways to position their organizations to respond to the demands of the current situation, while simultaneously focusing on future challenges. This monograph examines how four Chairmen Joint Chiefs of Staff—Generals Colin L. Powell (1989-93), John M. Shalikashvili (1993-97), Henry Hugh Shelton (1997-2001), and Richard B. Myers (2001-05)—used a strategic planning system to enable them to meet their statutory responsibilities specified in Title 10 U.S. Code and respond to the strategic environment. As the 1990s progressed, the first three Chairmen were faced with responding to a strategic environment that started with the Gulf War and was followed by an increasing number of regional military operations across the spectrum of conflict, while accommodating slowly declining financial resources and a one-third decline in force structure. Since 2000, and particularly after September 11, 2001, the last two Chairmen were faced with entirely different strategic challenges dominated by the focus on terrorism and the wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq, while needing to transform by developing future capabilities to achieve full spectrum dominance.

In focusing on how these four leaders used a strategic planning system, this Letort Paper briefly describes the Chairman's responsibilities, as well as the Joint Staff's key organizational characteristics. Both the leader's focus and the organization's characteristics will influence how a strategic planning system is used. The author then examines how the strategic planning system evolved to better meet each Chairman's needs. This planning system produced many products related to assessment, vision, strategy, resources, and plans. These products will be described for their broad impact and influence. Because many of these products are classified, the assessments necessarily will be brief. The author then

summarizes the more significant ways each Chairman used this strategic planning system, which is part of his leadership legacy.

While this comprehensive assessment of each Chairman's use of strategic planning has historical relevancy, its main value is that today's leaders can learn from how these four leaders used systems and processes differently to respond to their complex global environment and varied strategic challenges. During this assessment, specific leadership concepts are illustrated throughout, including how leaders use vision; how leaders balance flexibility and structure in strategic planning processes and products; how leaders use strategic planning to respond to different types of global environment challenges; and how leaders use systems to influence an organization's climate and culture. Hence, this paper concludes by identifying five key leadership concepts that future leaders should employ when using strategic planning.

CHAIRMAN'S RESPONSIBILITIES

Congress specified the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff's formal leadership responsibilities in Title 10 U.S. Code, Section 153, under the following descriptive subheadings:¹ (1) Strategic direction; (2) Strategic planning; (3) Contingency planning and preparedness; (4) Advice on requirements, programs, and budget; (5) Doctrine, training, and education; and (6) Other matters. These increased responsibilities were a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA), which is considered the most significant piece of defense legislation since the National Security Defense Act of 1947 established the Defense Department.² The GNA was the result of almost 4 years of contentious dialogue and debate among Congress, military leaders, the defense intellectual community, and the Reagan administration on how best to organize the Defense Department fundamentally to strengthen civilian authority, improve military advice to civilian leaders, provide for more efficient use of resources, and better execute in the field to respond to the nation's security challenges.³

Since the U.S. Code was changed to incorporate the GNA's provisions, the major functions and broad wording describing the Chairman's key responsibilities fundamentally have remained

the same, but there have been a few additions. These additions are associated with reports required by Congress, which were not envisioned in 1986, to assist members with their oversight and resource responsibilities. For example, the Chairman must now produce an annual report on combatant command requirements about the time when a budget is submitted to Congress. Most significantly, the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required that the Chairman produce, by February 15 of every even-numbered year, a detailed report that is a biennial review of the National Military Strategy to include the strategic and military risks to execute that strategy.⁴ This 2004 Act cleared up ambiguity that existed as to whether the Chairman actually needed to produce a National Military Strategy and what it should encompass. This change to existing U.S. Code is an example where the Chairman's responsibilities initially were broad and identified "what" he had to do vice "how" to do it. But if Congress is not satisfied with execution or information, then the subsequent Code becomes more specific.

To help with executing his responsibilities, the Joint Staff now directly supports the Chairman, an important distinction emphasized in the GNA. The Joint Staff has a budget of under \$700 million and consists of approximately 700 military officers, 210 enlisted members, and 195 civilians, which is about a 15 percent military reduction from 2000.⁵ Further, there are others, such as those in the Defense Intelligence Agency or contractors, who work alongside this staff to support their focused work directly. The Chairmen used a well-documented strategic planning system, which formally changed four different times (1990, 1993, 1997, and 1999), to help them execute the first four formal responsibilities identified earlier.⁶ This planning system's importance is reflected by the words "primary" and "formal" that appeared in the beginning of all Joint Staff guidance that described the desired impact of its products and processes.

The Chairman's strategic planning system creates products to integrate defense processes and influence others related to assessment, vision, strategy, resources, and plans.⁷ This planning system integrates the processes and documents of the people and organizations above the Chairman (President and Secretary of Defense) and the people and organizations with whom he directly

coordinates (Services and Combatant Commanders). The Chairman has no control over any significant defense resources (Secretary of Defense and Services control resources) or direct control of operational military forces (Combatant Commanders control operational forces); however, orders to those forces flow through him. The Chairman formally influences his civilian leaders and those with whom he coordinates through this strategic planning system. In addition to influencing leaders, this system provides specific direction for many staffs that support these leaders. As such, this planning system is a key function that integrates the Nation's military strategy, plans, and resources consisting of approximately 2.24 million active, guard, and reserve forces and total defense outlays of \$290B in 2000 that increased to \$465B by 2005.⁸

STRATEGIC CHALLENGES, CULTURE, AND STRUCTURE

Strategic challenges can affect both a leader's and staff's use of a strategic planning system. The major challenges the Chairmen faced in the 1990s are characterized by the following: global competition and regional instability; increased military operations across the spectrum of conflict; slowly declining financial and personnel resources; rising maintenance and infrastructure costs; Cold-War focused equipment; and a need to infuse new technology. Since 2000, with the Secretary of Defense's initial focus on transformation, followed shortly by the Global War on Terror and then the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, these challenges significantly changed in scope and character. To meet these new challenges, there was an increase of financial resources and better integrated technology, but there was no military manpower growth.⁹

Each Chairman generally used a consensus and collaborative leadership style when dealing with civilian and military leaders, but there were differences in their style and focus.¹⁰ This style and focus can have important influences on their organization's climate and culture. What they pay attention to, what they say, and what organizational systems they use can embed and reinforce a certain culture within their organization.¹¹ The Chairman establishes his unique "joint" climate that has been shaped by years of Service

culture and experiences. The other Joint Chiefs, who serve dually as their separate military Service Chiefs, may embrace that joint climate. But they are also steeped in their Service culture and have specific Service interests and Title 10 responsibilities they must articulate and sometimes defend. For example, each Service Chief routinely identified unfunded needs to improve effectiveness. The officers on the Joint Staff, who have specific joint responsibilities among the eight staff directorates, only serve in this joint climate between 2 to 3 years before most return to their respective Services. While developing a joint culture was difficult, a strategic planning system can be an important reinforcing mechanism leaders can use to change existing culture.

In addition to these culture issues, there are multiple structural layers between the highest and the lowest levels of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A strategic planning system must integrate the focused interests within these levels. For example, to process a typical Joint Staff action, there are between four and six layers where an issue will be scrutinized and revised to respond to these focused interests. This occurs typically as the staff action flows from action officer to division chief to the first general officer to J-Staff Director to Director Joint Staff and, finally, to Vice Chairman or Chairman. Within these structural layers are the historic cultural influences officers bring with them when working on or with this staff for a short time. Hence a strategic planning system must be both inclusive and flexible enough to accommodate these staff structural realities, while being responsive to the leader's needs. Table 1 summarizes these strategic planning challenges and decisionmaking influences.

STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM CHANGES

Having identified the leader's challenge, culture, and structure as they influence strategic planning, this paper now focuses on the changes to the planning system itself to give one insight into its use. There were four formal changes to the strategic planning system in 1990, 1993, 1997, and 1999. While the 1999 version is the current Chairman's operation instruction in 2005, it has not been completely followed and is currently being revised. These formal changes, along with the current system in use, will be examined.

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990-2005

1990s Challenges

- A. Regional competition and threats
- B. Gulf War
- C. Greater number military operations
- D. Declining financial and personnel resources
- E. Need to integrate technology
- F. Well maintained Cold War equipment

2000s Challenges

- A. Global War on Terror
- B. Iraq and Afghanistan
- C. Continued global engagements
- D. Increasing financial resources
- E. Need to transform to capabilities
- F. Updated but worn equipment

Decisionmaking Influences:

- A. Chairman uses consensus and collaborative leadership style with little direct control
- B. Joint climate versus Service's unique culture
- C. Financial focus on effectiveness
- D. Four to six structural layers to process actions

Table 1. Key Challenges and Decisionmaking Influences.

1989 Status.

Prior to 1990 there was a realization that the strategic planning system, as specified in the January 24, 1989, *Memorandum of Policy No. 84*, was not accomplishing its purpose to enable the Chairman to execute fully his increased 1986 GNA responsibilities. This memorandum, the 17th revision since 1952, was described as "... unwieldy, complex, and bureaucratic, and produced no less than 10 major documents every 2-year planning cycle."¹² Congress criticized the strategic planning process itself during hearings that led to passing the GNA. Hence, the Joint Staff's Director of Strategy and Planning was tasked to "... undertake an end-to-end evaluation of the products which are created by the Joint Strategic Planning System ... to seek further opportunities in the cogency and timeliness of the process and products."¹³ Such a comprehensive evaluation was the exception and not the norm.

1990 Change.

The outcome of this complete system overhaul culminated with *Memorandum of Policy No. 7*, dated January 30, 1990.¹⁴ This change streamlined the system by adding front-end leader's guidance and eliminating or combining many other documents into more concise

products, as ten products were reduced to four. The front-end guidance was provided through a formal joint strategy review for ". . . gathering information, raising issues, and facilitating the integration of strategy, operational planning, and program assessments,"¹⁵ that culminated in publishing its first product—*Chairman's Guidance*. This concise document (6 to 10 pages) was structured to provide the principal, initial guidance in support of developing the planning system's next three documents: the *National Military Strategy Document*, *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*, and the *Chairman's Program Assessment*.

This system, although streamlined, still required that a classified *National Military Strategy Document* (NMSD) be produced under a rigid 2-year cycle with several parts, one of which was called *National Military Strategy*. In addition, there were several separate functional annexes added to this document, such as intelligence and research and development that totaled hundreds of pages. One annex alone had 11 chapters, 13 tables, and 15 tabs. The part of the NMSD called the *National Military Strategy* (also classified) was sent to the Secretary of Defense for review, forwarded to the President for approval, and then returned to influence defense resource guidance. As will be later described, only the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* was produced as specified in the memorandum; the other three documents were changed significantly during execution. These changes enabled the Chairman to respond more nimbly to the strategic environment, then dominated by the Soviet Union's demise and the Gulf War's quick completion.

1993 Change.

The next revision to the organization's planning system culminated with publication of a change to *Memorandum of Policy No. 7* in 1993.¹⁶ This change essentially codified what had been executed in previous years rather than designing a new system. Major revisions, which built on these practices, included placing more focus on long-range planning overall by requiring formal environmental scanning; issuing the *National Military Strategy* as an unclassified document designed to communicate with the American people

rather than providing internal military direction; and establishing a *Joint Planning Document* to sharpen the Chairman's advice to the Secretary of Defense on budget issues. The process and product, called the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*, which provided guidance to combatant commanders to develop plans to execute the strategy in the field, remained fairly constant.

1997 Change.

The next major revision to the strategic planning system occurred in 1997 and again reflected execution changes the Chairman instituted in prior years.¹⁷ The Chairman needed to provide better resource advice and long-range direction to enable defense leaders to make needed mission or weapon system trade-offs required by fiscally constrained defense budgets. His planning system did not provide him this ability.

To correct this problem, in 1994 General Shalikashvili expanded the charter of the existing Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).¹⁸ This council, chaired by his Vice Chairman and including the Services' Vice Chairmen, was empowered to assess specific warfighting areas. This expanded charter created analytical rigor in an inclusive review process to shape mission or weapon system decisions among the Services. It provided recommendations that later appeared in a new leader-focused resource document called the *Chairman's Program Recommendation*. The older Chairman's assessment was retained. In 1996, General Shalikashvili published the first Chairman's vision, *Joint Vision 2010*, a 34-page document designed to provide the conceptual template to channel the vitality of people and leverage technology to achieve more effective joint warfighting.¹⁹ These two new planning products were added formally to the planning system's guidance published in 1997 as a Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction. Memoranda of Policies were phased out.

1999 Change.

The last formal change to the strategic planning system in 1999 did not change any major processes or products.²⁰ Instead, it focused

War on Terrorism, Chairman's Risk Assessment, and the Joint Operations Concepts (changed to Capstone Concept for Joint Operations in August 2005). The two strategic planning products deleted were the joint vision (vision is now embedded in the strategy) and the Joint Planning Document (staff resource advice). The unclassified strategy, two leader-focused resource documents, and the war planning guidance remained the same. As the 1999 operating instruction is currently under revision, the next one will be influenced by these practical changes and a recent study on strategic planning by the Institute for Defense Analysis. These strategic planning system changes as of June 2005 and integrating relationships are depicted in Figure 2.²³

Strategy: Foundation for all Major Processes




Figure 2. Strategy: Foundation for all Major Processes.

STRATEGIC PLANNING PRODUCTS

The Chairman's strategic planning process just described created many products to provide formal direction to manage existing demands and respond to future challenges during this 16-year period. As mentioned, there were products related to assessment,

vision, strategy, resources, and plans; all subjects identified in the academic literature as what a strategic planning system should address. The key planning products in each of these major subjects are now discussed for their broad direction.

Assessment.

The Chairmen's assessment of the strategic environment, called the *Joint Strategy Review*, became a constant strategic planning product beginning in 1993; however, it was completed in different ways and with different focuses.²⁴ A separate classified report was issued frequently, but at other times the intellectual output from the review process was used to update this system's strategy or vision documents or prepare the Joint Staff to support the *Quadrennial Defense Review*. When a separate report was produced, it often would identify issues that needed more intense study or areas where existing strategic planning products needed updating. The Chairman directed what the strategy review would entail prior to its start, hence this review responded to strategic issues he needed examined. The strategy review process was not conducted within the Joint Staff alone, but included representatives from the Services, Combatant Commands, and appropriate Defense organizations. The process was inclusive in design, allowing ideas to be initially introduced from an organization's lower levels, which helped ensure this strategy review had a broad perspective that resonated with those the Chairman influenced.

Another type of assessment, now called the *Chairman's Risk Assessment*, has been part of the strategic planning system since 2000. Earlier, the Chairman assessed strategic issues under the overarching construct of a net assessment, which was loosely defined in his planning instructions and did not always result in a formal product. In addition, Congress required the Chairman to write an assessment of the Secretary of Defense's *Quadrennial Defense Review*, which appeared at this document's end. The Chairman's risk assessment started as an annual assessment with the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)²⁵ and was modified to require greater specificity by the 2004 NDAA.²⁶ The Chairman is required to conduct a comprehensive examination of the strategic and military risk to execute the *National*

Military Strategy.²⁷ There are defined areas this report must address, along with a caveat that it must be routed through the Secretary of Defense if risk is determined to be significant.

Vision.

The strategic planning system's first two vision documents, *Joint Vision 2010* in 1996 and *Joint Vision 2020* in 2000, each consisted of about 35 pages.²⁸ They were used to identify joint warfighting requirements 10 to 15 years out and directly influence Service programs to meet those requirements. In organizational terms, this was a way the Chairman was trying to embed a joint climate within the Services' cultures through resource direction. The first vision was centered on four operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection. It served to focus attention and leverage technology to achieve better joint interoperability and warfighting. The second vision directly built upon the first, as it kept the same four operational concepts. But it placed more emphasis on innovation, information, and interagency coordination to transform the force to be fully joint; now defined as "intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically."²⁹ Both visions had broad acceptance as Service leaders spoke positively about each vision's influence in shaping their decisions or in influencing their Service visions. These two visions were the most mentioned strategic planning products in the Chairman's annual posture statements to Congress during this time frame, which is an indicator of their importance.³⁰

The current joint vision is now embedded in three pages of the 2004 *National Military Strategy*. This vision built upon the previous joint vision, as it is focused on the goal of full spectrum dominance, which is defined as "the ability to control any situation or defeat any adversary across the range of military operations."³¹ While the Chairman's vision is still specified, its purpose to influence Service resource decisions was replaced by the Secretary of Defense's transformation guidance documents in the 2000s, with the Services developing transformation plans to execute this guidance. However, the vision of full spectrum dominance is in conceptual agreement with the more detailed transformation guidance.

Vision can be focused operationally in addition to being strategic. The Chairman's *Joint Operations Concepts* in 2003 and now the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* in 2005 provided an operational warfighting focus to develop a capabilities-based joint force.³² This capabilities focus was described in the 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Review* and later in other defense guidance. The focus of the 28-page *Joint Operations Concepts* was to articulate the overarching concept for future joint military operations. It broadly defined the construct for robust subordinate operating, functional, and enabling concepts to create joint capabilities. The 2005 *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* incorporated lessons learned from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, while looking to the future to develop capabilities to fight tomorrow's wars. These operationally-focused vision documents, and the substantive complex processes and products developed to implement these concepts, are encouraging military personnel to think and act jointly. The earlier joint visions, along with these operational-focused concepts, will complete the joint journey that began with Service deconfliction in the early 1990s, to interoperability in the mid-1990s, to now emerging interdependence. This is a journey to create a joint military culture.

Strategy.

The Chairman's unclassified *National Military Strategy*, the key strategic planning system product, was produced in 1992, 1995, 1997 and 2004.³³ These four strategies broadly outlined the military's global challenges; identified the objectives to be achieved; specified the foundations and principles of military power; and described the force structure or capabilities to achieve those objectives. This was essentially an *ends, ways, and means* paradigm to respond to the ever-changing strategic environment. In the first three strategies, the Service's force structure was defined broadly (carrier battle groups, divisions, and wings), but with greater specificity as the decade continued. For example, the 1997 strategy identified the numbers of Army regiments and brigades, Navy attack submarines, Coast Guard cutters, and Special Operations people. In the 2004 strategy, there was no reference to specific force structure. Instead, joint force attributes and capabilities were broadly identified, along with a need

to size the force in a 1-4-2-1 construct to accomplish the following: defend the homeland (1), deter forward in and from four regions (4); conduct two overlapping swiftly-defeat campaigns (2); and win decisively in one campaign (1).³⁴ This latest approach was designed to provide flexibility for force structure changes in concert with a capability vice a threat-based military focus.

When the 1990s began, the strategy was focused on global war, and the enemy was the Soviet Union. The 1992 strategy changed the focus to the core mission of fighting regional wars. The 1995 strategy more broadly encompassed global engagement across the spectrum of conflict from peacekeeping, to peacemaking, to war. In 1997, the strategy provided a balance between shaping the environment, responding to the multiple missions, and preparing now for the uncertain future. The words *shape*, *respond*, and *prepare* and their concepts appeared in many other strategic documents, such as the 1997 *National Security Strategy* and 1997 *Quadrennial Defense Review*. As these strategies changed in the 1990s, the force structure to accomplish these strategies was reduced by about one-third. In 2004, the strategy was simply articulated along three "P" words—"protect the United States against external attacks and aggression; prevent conflict and surprise attack; and prevail against adversaries."³⁵ Its success rested on the three priorities of winning the War on Terror, enhancing the ability to fight jointly, and transforming the Armed Forces through a combination of technology, intellect, and cultural adjustments.

In addition to the unclassified national military strategies, there were two classified strategies produced that were focused on the War on Terrorism. In October 2002, Chairman Myers and the Secretary of Defense issued a *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* to provide guidance to the military services and regional commanders to focus their efforts.³⁶ Later, in March 2005, they issued an update to that plan. This update, which went through many revisions, was described in a news article as "... a multipronged strategy that targets eight pressure points and outlines six methods for attacking terrorist networks."³⁷

Resources.

The Chairman's three resource documents (*Joint Planning Document*, *Chairman's Program Recommendation*, and *Chairman's Program Assessment*) expanded in the mid-1990s as strategic planning processes were developed to influence resource decisions.³⁸ These resource documents, along with the Defense documents they were intended to influence, were classified. As the decade progressed, these documents were focused to enable the Chairman to provide more resource influence and specificity, a requirement emphasized by the GNA.

The staff-focused resource document, *Joint Planning Document*, was produced biennially starting in 1993. It went from separate chapters developed by Joint Staff directorates or separate agencies to a fully integrated resource document in 1997 that used the Chairman's vision and warfighting assessments to produce integrated resource advice. However, by decade's end, this document was no longer published, which perhaps was an indicator of its declining influence.

The planning system's two leader-focused annual resource documents, *Chairman's Program Recommendation* and *Chairman's Program Assessment*, increased in influence and specificity starting in the middle 1990s. For example, the *Chairman's Program Assessment* went from a few pages in 1992 to an expanded assessment in 1995 that argued for shifting significant funds and pursuing different approaches for recapitalization that would readjust up to 12 percent of the defense budget.³⁹ These two leader-focused documents, which reflected the Chairman's style and priorities, were considered personal correspondence between the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense. Hence, they had limited external review and were classified. The program recommendation was designed to influence the Secretary's initial resource guidance to the Services. The program assessment was designed to enable the Chairman to assess the Service's Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) and influence budget deliberations that converted the Services POMs to the defense budget submitted to Congress. These two documents, which were shaped by the JROC's meetings, were vetted with the Service Chiefs

and Combatant Commanders instead of being merely coordinated. They were a formal way the Chairman, in addition to other resource advice, directly advocated the Combatant Commanders' requirements within the Defense processes.

Plans.

The *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* was the one constant among all the strategic planning changes during this 16-year period. It continued to have the same purpose, which was to provide strategic guidance to the Combatant Commanders and Service Chiefs to develop executable plans based on resourced military capabilities to execute the military strategy.⁴⁰ More specifically, it identified the various types of plans that Combatant Commanders must develop, as this document integrated higher-level guidance from the President and Secretary of Defense into a family of executable plans and apportioned forces based on completed budgets. It identified the agreed assumptions upon which these plans were based and specified the numerous functional annexes required by specific plans, such as intelligence, logistics, and mobility.

The actual contents of the JSCP were classified, but it evolved during this 16-year time period as the types of plans it tasked changed in response to the changing threats and the different military strategies. For example, in 1990 it specified global (Cold War focused) and regional plans. They were replaced in 1993 with Operational Plans (OPLANS), Concept Plans (CONPLANS), and concept summaries for global and regional contingencies. Later there was guidance to develop theater engagement plans, which are now called security cooperation plans. In the 1990s, these products continued to be reviewed formally for currency within an overall 2-year planning cycle, and were republished or amended during this cycle. In the 2000s, the intent was to shorten this planning cycle to 1 year, and the process by which Combatant Commanders develop plans also received additional Secretary of Defense involvement.

CHAIRMAN'S LEGACY

General Powell (1989-93).

General Powell greatly simplified strategic planning by reducing the number of formal planning products from 10 to 4 and increasing the system's flexibility to respond to his direction by a concise leader-focused document called *Chairman's Guidance*. He short-circuited the system's processes, as he did not wait for a completed environmental assessment specified by his planning system, but issued this guidance based on a senior commander's meeting.⁴¹ He did not wait for his planning system's structured processes and coordination cycles to produce another classified, voluminous military strategy document with hundreds of pages of annexes, but published an unclassified 27-page *National Military Strategy* in 1992 under his signature.

Considered the most significant strategy change since the 1950s, this strategy's content, overall coordination, and the force structure incorporated within it were more a result of his interpersonal skills than of a formal strategic planning process.⁴² This strategy's focus on communicating with the American people and Congress, versus the internal staff advice it provided before, was an important legacy that remains today. In the resource area, while his planning system specified a detailed assessment of Service programs not to exceed 175 pages, his assessment was a very short memorandum.⁴³ While General Powell did not use many formal planning processes, he kept some structure. For example, he used the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* and structured processes to keep the military in the field focused operationally.

While his strategic planning products clearly addressed the military's challenges as identified in the Chairman's annual Posture Statements to Congress, very few strategic planning products or processes (average five) were mentioned in his statements. In addition, the word "joint" also was not emphasized in his lexicon, as this word barely appeared in these same statements.⁴⁴ As the first Chairman fully under the GNA's direction, a joint climate had not yet evolved. Since he did not follow his planning system in producing three of its four products, either the system was not nimble enough to respond to fast-moving challenges, or he preferred a leadership

style where personal relationships dominated when providing formal advice.

General Shalikashvili (1993-97).

General Shalikashvili used the strategic planning system markedly differently than his predecessor. He kept the flexibility and simplicity his predecessor established by limiting the strategy's complexity, but he emphasized using the planning processes to develop it. For example, his two national military strategies in 1995 and 1997 were coordinated fully within the planning system's processes, and other strategic planning products were used in their development. He kept the same structure in war planning as his predecessor, but he expanded its focus by requiring new theater engagement plans to more fully implement his 1997 strategy's "shape" component.

General Shalikashvili went further in providing long-term strategic direction, when he published the Chairman's first vision in 1996, and later included it in the planning system. He used considerable interpersonal skills, which included sending personal notes to his colleagues and personally reviewing every recommended change to develop this vision.⁴⁵ He used this same strategic planning system to start an implementing process for the vision. He also fostered a close relationship with defense officials using the strategic planning system through his consensus and process-focused decision style. For example, his vision gained wide acceptance with civilian and military leaders, aspects of it appeared in Defense resource documents, and his environment assessment helped focus the initial work of the Department of Defense's first *Quadrennial Defense Review*.⁴⁶

General Shalikashvili expanded strategic planning in the resource areas, as he added a short leader-focused document called the *Chairman's Program Recommendation* that continues today. He used his Vice Chairman to expand by roughly a factor of 10 the amount of time spent by the JROC to access programs analytically and provide resource recommendations that appeared in his two leader-focused resource documents.⁴⁷ Using outputs from this council, his resource advice to the Secretary of Defense grew in content and influence. He

mentioned strategic planning products and processes in his annual Posture Statements to Congress an average of 15 times, versus his predecessor's average of five. He also mentioned the word joint or derivatives of that word about 25 times during these posture statements, which is an indicator of his focus.⁴⁸ Perhaps his most important legacy was that his vision, process-focused strategic planning system, and joint emphasis embedded a joint climate within his staff and those he influenced. This established the foundation for today's joint thinking.

General Shelton (1997-2001).

General Shelton used the strategic planning system in a very process-oriented manner. No substantive changes were made to this system overall, but he focused on using it to promote evolutionary changes to the military and provide difficult resource recommendations. Similar to his predecessors, he kept the heavily structured war planning document and processes relatively untouched, but he more fully integrated theater engagement plans within the planning processes. He defined a process to implement his predecessor's joint vision by identifying 21st century challenges and the desired operating capabilities to meet them, while providing direction to conduct vision-related experiments.⁴⁹ In 2000, during the later part of his tenure, he fully used the strategic planning processes to update formally the joint vision to better incorporate concepts associated with leveraging the information component, encouraging more innovation, and using the interagency to help resolve strategic issues.⁵⁰

He also improved the process and timeliness of the leader-focused strategic planning resource recommendations to defense leaders. He elevated the work of the JROC and the associated processes to be more strategic in nature.⁵¹ He used his resources and leadership influence to more directly support quality of life programs for military people and their families, the importance of which was specifically covered in his Congressional Posture Statements.⁵² For example, he mentioned strategic planning products and processes an average of 22 times and joint 44 times in these posture statements, which were indicators of his process and joint leadership focus.⁵³ Most importantly, he clearly

continued the joint focus. He built on General Shalikashvili's work to embed that joint climate more strongly and perhaps establish the beginning of a joint culture within his staff and the Services.

General Myers (2001-05).

General Myers faced a more challenging strategic environment caused by the September 11, 2001, attack. His environment was dominated by the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with the Global War on Terror that continues today. If this was not enough, the need to transform in stride also occupied his and his staff's energy. These challenges caused him to modify significantly the strategic planning system he inherited. He referenced strategic planning processes and products more than any other Chairman, illustrating the importance he placed on this system.⁵⁴ These modifications, which involved three new strategy-related products, have not yet been codified in a Chairman's strategic planning instruction. However, instructions have been published that specify the processes used by the JROC and establish new Functional Capability Boards that shape issues before the JROC. The programs this council reviewed also greatly expanded, which provided greater joint inclusiveness in his resource advice.⁵⁵ To illustrate this greater inclusiveness, the Functional Capability Boards review all programs with a joint impact, instead of those with large dollar criteria only, and members of defense agencies or even other government agencies such as Homeland Security can attend meetings associated with these programs.

The strategy parts of his strategic planning system differed most from those of his predecessors. He and the Secretary of Defense produced a separate classified strategy focused on the War on Terrorism in 2002 and updated it in 2005 to better link the military element to the many other national strategies associated with combating terrorism. The Chairman's 2004 *National Military Strategy*, redrafted numerous times, was completed in May 2004 as the need for a Chairman's military strategy, along with the need to assess the strategic and military risk to execute that strategy, was clarified by Congress in the 2004 NDAA. He also succinctly identified the overall joint vision in this strategy.

Chairman Myers' identified the importance of a joint culture or being "born joint" in several of his Posture Statements.⁵⁶ His focus on operationalizing a vision with the additional joint concepts and inclusive processes resulting from the 2003 *Joint Operations Concepts* and 2005 *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* have the potential to create a remarkable legacy for transforming to a true joint force. He instituted a greater top-down and combatant commander input on jointness to develop capabilities to create a synergistic joint end-state now called interdependency. It is too early to determine the result of his efforts, as developing capabilities to achieve joint interdependency takes years; however, he not only enhanced the joint climate, but perhaps established a culture of real jointness among all the military services. Creating a culture is much more difficult than creating a climate, but it is more powerful once established.

CONCLUSION

Today's senior leaders can learn from examining how others used systems or processes to better enable their organizations to respond to complex and ambiguous strategic challenges. Examining how four Chairmen of different leadership styles used an evolving strategic planning system to respond to the complex and ever changing strategic environment reveals five key leadership concepts today's leaders should employ. These leadership concepts are organized along the following five areas: importance of a vision; key characteristics of an effective strategic planning process; the need to strike a balance between flexibility and structure within the strategic planning system's products; understanding the magnitude of change needed; and using systems and processes to create a culture.

The first leadership concept is that leaders need to clearly articulate a vision, owned by the organization, as part of the strategic planning system to influence long-term change effectively. Chairman Shalikashvili clearly identified a need for a joint vision in 1996 and employed an inclusive leader-involved process to create that vision, which had wide acceptance among those he coordinated with and those above him. Chairman Shelton followed this and developed comprehensive processes to implement that vision before he formally updated the joint vision in 2000 to place more emphasis

on innovation, information, and interagency. Chairman Myers continued with a vision focus through his two concept guidance documents to transform the military operationally to a higher level of jointness. Much of the joint warfighting progress to date can be traced back to the first two visions, and the current vision to achieve full spectrum dominance is being directed by the 2005 *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*.

The second leadership concept is that leaders need to ensure their strategic planning processes are flexible, inclusive, and integrated to improve effectiveness. The flexible aspect rests with the fact that, in execution, each Chairman modified to different degrees the strategic planning system he inherited. This was caused by the leader's style and the strategic environment. For example, Chairman Powell's modification of the planning system from ten classified, voluminous products into four products of greater clarity and simplicity that were developed more nimbly was influenced by the Cold War's unexpected demise and his personal leadership style. Chairman Shalikashvili's addition of leader-focused resource advice and joint vision was influenced by the tight fiscal environment and his process-oriented style. The inclusive aspect is supported by the diverse composition of the joint boards and councils that developed strategic planning products, which allowed divergent views to be heard, understood, and incorporated. Interviews with strategic planners revealed that these inclusive processes educated and created important relationships, and many planners even considered planning processes more important than products.⁵⁷ The integrated nature aspect goes one step further than inclusiveness in that this system's planning processes directly influenced other Defense, Service, and combatant command leaders and their processes to ensure the end result was integrated.

The third leadership concept centers on the need for leaders to ensure their strategic planning products have the proper balance between flexibility and structure. The Chairman's strategic planning products related to strategy and vision had great flexibility in providing broad direction, which enabled staffs to use their intellectual capacities to develop a wide range of successful responses to complex issues. The Chairman's strategic planning products related to plans

had a much greater degree of structure to provide the needed disciplined direction to execute those strategies. This disciplined direction in developing war plans is driven by the systems integration and overall synchronization that is associated with joint interdependence needed by the supportive and supporting combatant commanders. Disciplined direction in developing war plans, then, allows the creativity needed in execution, as disciplined planning considers various options that are vetted prior to execution.

The fourth leadership concept is that leaders need to understand the relationship between the magnitude and speed of change needed and how a strategic planning system can be used to influence that change. If change is needed quickly and is revolutionary in scope, then leaders should not use a strategic planning system but work outside that formal system. For example, when Chairman Powell created the 1992 *National Military Strategy*, a strategy revolutionary in substance when compared to its predecessors, he did not follow the processes or product characteristics described in his strategic planning system. Similarly, Chairman Shalikashvili did not follow directions in his strategic planning system but used extraordinary personnel interaction when creating the Chairman's first joint vision, a direction thought outside the Chairman's domain. However, in implementing both this strategy and vision, which would take a decade or more, the strategic planning system was used heavily. Hence, a strategic planning system is more valued to make the needed evolutionary changes over time that can ultimately lead to revolutionary results.

The last leadership concept is that leaders can use a strategic planning system to help them create a climate and embed a culture within complex organizations. While there have been many other mechanisms that influenced a joint culture such as Congressional-required joint promotion, assignment, and educational criteria, the strategic planning system reinforced these mechanisms. While Chairman Powell was just starting to create a joint climate, Chairman Shalikashvili greatly reinforced that climate with his strategic planning joint vision and inclusive planning bodies that developed the system's resource products. Chairman Shelton reinforced that joint climate and started the beginning of a joint culture through

implementing the joint vision and more inclusive planning bodies. Chairman Myers focused on embedding a joint culture through his expansive joint operating concepts and more inclusive functional capabilities boards. It is this author's belief, based on working within and studying the effects of strategic planning during this period, that a culture of jointness, envisioned in the heart and spirit of many of our nation's civilian and military leaders, has taken hold within the higher levels of the Joint Staff and the Services. The strategic planning system clearly assisted this joint cultural evolution.

Leaders of complex organizations who embrace the concepts just mentioned will be able to better use a strategic planning system to respond to their strategic challenges and provide direction to their organizations to meet the current demands while positioning for the future. An examination of history has shown that each Chairman's ever evolving strategic planning system comprised of inclusive and flexible processes, along with the right combination of flexibility and structure in products, was important in enabling him to provide strategic advice and direction to our nation's civilian and military leaders during volatile and uncertain times.

ENDNOTES

1. Robert H. Cole, *et al.*, *The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, Washington DC: Joint History Office, 1995, pp. 207-209.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

3. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Conference Report*, 99th Congress, 2nd session, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 12, 1986, Section 3, pp. 99-824; and Richard Meinhart, *Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff's Leadership Using the Joint Strategic Planning System in the 1990s: Recommendations for Strategic Leaders*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003, pp. 2-7.

4. House Report 108-354, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004," Section 903; "Biennial Review of the National Military Strategy by Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff," available from <http://thomas.loc.gov/>, accessed November 11, 2005.

5. The Joint Staff, "Fiscal Year (FY) 2004/FY 2005 Biennial Budget Estimates," February 2003, available from http://www.dod.gov/comptroller/defbudget/fy2004/budget_justification/pdfs/operation/Volume_1_-_DW_Justification/TJS_FY04-05_PB.pdf; accessed November 30, 2005. Personnel reductions reflect 1999 defense reform initiatives and 2002 Nation Defense Authorization Act guidance.

6. Detailed strategic planning guidance was reflected in Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 7, 1990; MOP 7, 1993; Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.01, 1997; and CJCSI 3100.01A, 1999.

7. Discussion that follows on relationships and integration of the leader with organizations above the Chairman and those he coordinates with is covered in the 2000 edition of *The Joint Staff Officers Guide* and in the memorandum and instructions that define the organization's strategic planning system.

8. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, "*National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2006*," April 2005; and "*National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2001*," March 2000, pp. 4, 33, both sources.

9. This discussion of challenges is the author's assessment from reading the four national military strategies and attending Service Chiefs' lectures while teaching at the Army War College.

10. Davis, p. 160; and Meinhart, 2003, pp. 11-12. Some Chairmen, such as Powell, had a more developed personal relationship with many leaders in Washington, DC, based on past experiences than General Shelton, who was relatively new to this strategic arena. In addition, each succeeding Chairman used "joint" words with varying frequency in his annual Congressional Posture statement.

11. Edgar H Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1993, p. 231.

12. Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., and Thomas-Durell Young, *U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003, pp. 10, 35-36.

13. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *CJCS Memorandum of Policy No. 84, CJCS MOP 84, Joint Strategic Planning System*, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 30, 1989, p. 3.

14. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Memorandum of Policy No. 7, CJCS MOP 7, Joint Strategic Planning System*, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 30, 1990. Discussion reflects materiel in this document.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

16. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *CJCS Memorandum of Policy No. 7, CJCS MOP 7, Joint Strategic Planning System*, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1st Revision, March 17, 1993. Discussion reflects material in this document.

17. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01, CJCSI 3100.01, *Joint Strategic Planning System*, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 1, 1997. Note: Chairman's instructions replaced memoranda of policies during this time period.

18. Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JROC Planning in a Revolutionary Era*, Washington, DC: The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1996, pp. 4-5.

19. John M. Shalikashvili, *Joint Vision 2010*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, p. 1.
20. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01, CJCSI 3100.01A, *Joint Strategic Planning System*, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 1, 1999. Discussion reflects material in this document.
21. The shape component was one of the three components of the 1997 *National Military Strategy*. The other two components were titled respond and prepare. These components are discussed later in the paper in the "Strategy" section.
22. "Joint Strategic Planning System" briefing slides for Joint Processes and Landpower Course 3, Lesson AY 05, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, October 28, 2004, slide 5.
23. "National Military Strategy Linkages and the Joint Strategic Planning System," briefing to Joint Faculty Education Conference, Washington, DC: National Defense University, June 22, 2005, slide 12. In Figure 2, IPL stands for Combatant Commanders Integrated Priority List, which identifies what combatant commanders desire that is not funded in Service programs. POMs are Program Objective Memorandums, the programs the Services desire to place in the upcoming budget submitted to Congress. JOpsC stands for *Joint Operating Concepts* described later in the paper's vision discussion. CPR is the *Chairman's Program Recommendation*, and CPA is the *Chairman's Program Assessment*, explained later in the resource discussion.
24. Author read many classified strategy reviews and correspondence documenting the process, and in May 2002 interviewed military planners who worked on the vision and military strategies during the 1990s.
25. House Report 106-162, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000," Section 1034, available from <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/uscode/index.html>; accessed December 4, 2005.
26. House Report 108-354, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004," Section 903, "Biennial Review of the National Military Strategy by Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff," available from <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin>; accessed November 11, 2005.
27. There is a congressional requirement under U.S. Code Title 10 Section 153 (b) for the Chairman to assess the strategic and military risks associated with executing the missions called for under the current *National Military Strategy*. This task is due not later than January 1 of every odd-numbered year. There is also a congressional requirement under Section 153 (d) to do a detailed biennial review of the *National Military Strategy*, which includes as part of this review an assessment of the military and strategic risks in executing the missions of the current strategy. This much more detailed review is due not later than February 15th of every even-numbered year.
28. Shalikashvili, *Joint Vision 2010*; and Henry H. Shelton, *Joint Vision 2020*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2000. Discussion reflects material from these documents.

29. Shelton, 2000, p. 2.

30. Richard M. Meinhardt, *Strategic Planning Through an Organizational Lens*, ProQuest UMI Dissertation Services, 2004, pp. 104-107. An analysis was performed on key words in the Chairman's annual Congressional Posture Statements to identify what was emphasized.

31. Richard B. Myers, *National Military Strategy*, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004, p. 20.

32. Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Joint Operations Concepts*, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 2003, available from www.dtic.mil/jointvision/secdef_approved_jopsc.doc; accessed December 1, 2005; and Richard B. Myers, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff August 2005, available from http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/approved_ccjov2.pdf; accessed December 1, 2005.

33. Discussions that follow reflect material in the following strategies: Colin L. Powell, *National Military Strategy of the United States*, January 1992; John M. Shalikashvili, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 1995; John M. Shalikashvili, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 1997; and Richard B. Myers, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 2004 (all, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff).

34. The overlapping swiftly defeat campaigns were described as quickly denying an adversary's operational or strategic objective in both locations and rapidly reestablishing security conditions favorable to the United States and its partners. A win decisively campaign is much broader in scope than a swiftly-defeat campaign. It is designed to bring about fundamental favorable and enduring results that may entail lengthy periods of combat and stability operations, along with significant investments of the nation's resources and time.

35. Myers, *NMS*, p. 8.

36. U.S. General Accounting Office, *Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to Terrorism*, Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, March 3, 2003, p. 5.

37. Linda Robinson, "Plan of Attack," *USNews.com*, August 1, 2005, available from <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/050801/1terror.htm>; accessed November 11, 2005.

38. Author's assessment from listening to many lectures from speakers at the U.S. Army War College from 1997 to 2005 who described these documents, and from reading some of the 1990 documents.

39. Office of the Vice Chairman, p. 23.

40. These words describing the JSCP's purpose remained fundamentally the same from the MOP 7 through CJCSI 3100.01A. The descriptions of the types of plans came from the strategic planning instructions and discussions with individuals who worked directly with the plans or taught this subject.

41. Lovelace and Young, endnote 45, p. 37.

42. Harry E. Rothman, *Forging a New National Military Strategy in a Post Cold War World: A Perspective from The Joint Staff*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992, p. 16; and Lorna S. Jaffe, *The Development of the Base Force 1989-1992*, Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 1993, pp. 48-50.

43. Meinhart, 2004, p. 132.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 104

45. Interview with Joint Staff planner on May 9, 2000; and Industrial College of the Armed Forces, *JV 2010 Case Analysis*, Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2002, p. 6.

46. *Joint Vision 2010* was referenced in *Defense Planning Guidance* and the Defense Department's logistics strategic plan. Many Service leaders spoke positively on this vision's influence. For the QDR influence linkage, see John Y. Schrader, Leslie Lewis, and Roger A. Brown, *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Analysis*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999, p. 19.

47. Office of the Vice Chairman, pp. 10-12.

48. Meinhart, 2004, p. 104.

49. Processes described in *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3010.02, Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan*, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 9, 1998; and *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3010.02A, Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan*, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 29, 2000.

50. Interagency is a term used to identify when other government agencies under the President collectively work together to respond to our nation's challenges.

51. "Statement of General Richard B. Myers, Vice Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee," April 4, 2000, <http://armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/2000/e000404.htm>; accessed November 20, 2005.

52. Meinhart, 2003.

53. Meinhart, 2004, p. 104.

54. Author analyzed Chairman Myers' posture statements in the same way done for the other Chairmen and he averaged the highest.

55. Author's assessment from reading the many CJCSIs that covered the Joint Requirements Oversight, Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments, and Functional Capability Boards since the middle 1990s.

56. Chairman Myers referenced "born joint" in his 2004 and 2004 Posture Statements to Congress. In addition, he talked about the importance of a cultural change in his 2002 and 2003 Posture Statements to change mindsets. He was the first Chairman to do so.

57. Meinhart, 2004, pp. 187-188.

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